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This article examines the impact of social media on regime transformation in Sri Lanka. 
Specifically, it looks at the role of Facebook in influencing the 2015 presidential election in 
which President Mahinda Rajapaksa was defeated. This article examines how users reflected 
on everyday life under the Rajapaksa regime, creating not only a shared narrative of anxieties 
amid economic and political uncertainty, but also strategies for achieving life-goals. Bringing 
into conversation three areas of political science, namely radical politics, the role of social 
media in politics, and popular dystopian discourse, this article draws on posts, videos, images, 
and comments surrounding the 2015 election, in examining the relationship between online 
interaction and activism. This article shows how the common expression of dystopian 
experience helped congeal an alternative vision, which was especially heightened by the 
possibilities offered by a new presidential election. The title 'butterflies taking down giants' 
serves as a metaphor for both the surprise defeat of Rajapaksa, but also for the surprising ways 
in which new media can influence electoral politics. 
 
 
Introduction 
‘Social media is to have fun, not to discuss serious stuff’, a woman in her early 20s advised 
Sri Lankan young people in a political advertisement produced by President Rajapaksa’s 
re-election campaign in 2015. Amidst the very busy period of the national election, 
Rajapaksa focused great attention to the growing trend of social media becoming an 
important platform for political discourse. Also prior to the election, President Rajapaksa 
                                                
1 The title of the article was inspired by the title of a blog post, ‘Presidential election advertising battle 
where giants were brought down by small butterflies,’ where the writer observed the significant pressure 
created by social media on the Rajapaksa regime during the election period (Jayasinghe 2015). 
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tweeted that some people want an Arab Spring2 in Sri Lanka (Rajapaksa 2014). Even after 
the election, the defeated politicians mocked the regime change as a ‘Facebook 
Revolution’. Therefore, it is evident that social media played a key role in mobilizing 
people against President Rajapaksa. This article posits that Rajapaksa was compelled to 
pay attention to social media given the significant pressure generated by a new form of 
online activism by ordinary citizens, especially through the use of Facebook, thus it is an 
article that explores 'butterflies taking down giants'. 
The Sinhala word for ‘butterfly’, namely samanalaya (samanalayo in plural) is 
significant because it also has a strong pejorative colloquial usage which is similar to the 
obscene word ponnaya (Podi Man 2011), that refers to effeminate men and/or individuals 
that self-identify as gay or transgender. More broadly, the word samanalaya is attributed 
to individuals who do not conform to the normative masculinity represented in the 
Sinhala Buddhist nationalist discourse. President Mahinda Rajapaksa, for instance, was 
considered a model of Sri Lankan masculinity; described by his devotees as 'fearless', 
'charismatic', 'well-built', and most importantly, a 'father' with three sons. Men falling 
short of such characteristics can be portrayed as 'less-than' a man. When we apply this 
social understanding to the political context, 'butterflies' or samanalayo designate 'simply 
the people who do not count, who have no entitlement to exercise the power of the 
arkhê3' (Ranciere 2010:32). In other words, samanalayo are individuals who have no 
power, and thus cannot govern. According to Ranciere, the term ‘people’ can only be 
used when these individuals rupture their social order by acting as agents with the power 
to influence (Ranciere 2010:33). 
Due to the rapid growth of the Internet and Facebook in Sri Lanka, and the state’s 
inability (or unwillingness) to control the growth of social media platforms as it has done 
with the mainstream media, Facebook, has become the most important space for 
individuals seeking to question the exercising of power by the state. According to Internet 
World Stats, there were 121,500 internet users in Sri Lanka in 2000, increasing to 5.7 
million by November 2015. Of these 5.7 million, Facebook users numbered 
approximately 3.4 million (Internet World Stats 2015). To put this in context, the total 
population in 2015 was 20 million. Since all the mainstream media networks, directly or 
indirectly, were under the Rajapaksa regime, Facebook became a vital space for people 
to voice their support, or indeed displeasure with Rajapaksa's policies, actions, and 
inactions. Anti-Rajapaksa discourse, in fact, dominated the political discourse on 
Facebook by a significant margin. When considering the narrow win by the opposition
                                                
2 Arab Spring is well known for its high use of social media, especially Facebook, and some media such as 
CNN even named it as Facebook revolution (Taylor 2011). However, in Sri Lanka, the popular 
understanding of Arab Spring is negative due to the destruction resulted in countries like Libya after the 
involvement of Western powers.   
3 Here, Ranciere continues by suggesting that 'The logic of arkhe thus presupposes that a determinate 
superiority is exercised over an equally determinate inferiority' (Ranciere 2010: 30). 
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coalition's 'common candidate' Maithripala Sirisena over President Rajapaksa, the 
impact of Facebook on the electoral result was strongly felt by the public.  
However, popular interpretations of the regime transformation often undervalue the 
importance of individual online volunteerism. For ardent supporters of the present 
government, it was a ‘revolution’ (Wijewardena 2015), and indeed, a ‘revolution’ from 
above. In other words, this ‘revolution’ occurred due to the activities of a few very smart 
and resourceful politicians. For Rajapaksa devotees, it was a 'fool’s rebellion' (Pathirana 
2015). The main argument here was that people were simply fooled by the false messages 
propagated by the opposition. Extreme leftists argue that the regime transformation was 
simply a change of elites (Chaminda 2015). Still others suggest that the regime 
transformation occurred because of a conspiracy involving India and Western countries 
against President Rajapaksa (Kasthurirathna 2016). Though these interpretations have 
come from antagonistic groups, what they have in common is that they all devalue the 
importance of voluntary public action, by over-emphasising or glorifying the elite factor. 
In other words, the logic behind these different interpretations remains the notion that 
people are generally ignorant, and that politics necessarily entails the manipulation of 
this ignorance by the elites for their own agendas. Here, I argue that Facebook activism 
played a critical role beyond its uses as a ‘way of having fun’, and that social media 
narratives on Facebook can be read as political texts. Heeding Jacques Ranciere's 
comment that ‘everyone has the same intelligence’4, I suggest that Facebook users, far 
from blindly following some elite or foreign conspiracy, succeeded in mounting a 
significant critique about the present state of the country, articulating with broad 
resonance everyday lived experience under the Rajapaksa regime. This critical 
consciousness, in turn, led to campaigning for the alternative 'common candidate' in 
Sirisena to escape from the Rajapaksa present.  
In order to understand people’s critical engagement against dominant politics, I used 
Facebook posts, videos and comments. Here, due to lack of proficiency in Tamil, I was 
unable to examine the expressions of the Tamil speaking community including both 
Tamils and Muslims. As a result, my analysis excludes the North and East regions where 
Tamil is the main language, and instead explains the impact of the anti-Rajapaksa 
discourse of the Sinhala speaking community in the South in regards to regime 
transformation. 
In the following discussion, I employ the concept of 'dystopia' in examining the 
language and expressions used in social media political discourse. Here, I concentrate 
on the political effects of dystopian narratives, by examining how the anti-Rajapaksa 
discourse on Facebook represented everyday lived experience under the regime. Of 
particular interest is the way Facebook users employed the concept of dystopia in their 
own ways to construct a counter-discourse, thus contributing to the defeat the Rajapaksa 
                                                
4 This idea has been masterfully analysed in The Ignorant Schoolmaster (1991) 
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regime in the 2015 election. The Sri Lankan case, in many ways, serves as an example 
to political activism in understanding how the use of social media can strongly influence 
electoral politics. I first start with a summary of the Rajapaksa regime, the opposition 
candidate Sirisena's cross-over, and then illustrate how Facebook users developed a 
common political narrative. The final section then analyses how this understanding of 
the Rajapaksa regime, articulated in dystopian language, was ultimately used to counter 
its continuance in the 2015 presidential election.  
 
Background 
Mahinda Rajapaksa became the fifth president of Sri Lanka in 2005 through a 
controversial presidential election where he won 50.29% of the vote (Department of 
Elections n.d.). In 2009, after a few months in office, he launched a large (and 
controversial) military operation against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), that 
culminated in the annihilation of the LTTE and spelled the end of a 30-year bloody war. 
Eight months later, Rajapaksa called another presidential election one year ahead of 
schedule. his time he received 58% of the electoral vote. Three months after the election, 
he received a clear majority in the 2010 parliamentary election. Rajapaksa was able to 
create an artificial 2/3 majority with the help of opposition parliamentarians who crossed 
over to ‘strengthen the president’s hands’5. Therefore, during this time, he seemed 
invincible due to his popularity. Some Rajapaksa devotees even tattooed the president’s 
face on their bodies to show their love for their leader (see Appendices).  
It was evident that there was no strong opposition to President Rajapaksa. However, 
all this changed when he called a presidential election to be president for the third 
consecutive term. As a response, the secretary of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP)5, 
Maithripala Sirisena, crossed over to the opposition, and major opposition parties 
nominated him as the common candidate. Apart from political parties, many civil 
activists and organizations supported him. However, the most important element in his 
campaign was the voluntarism of ordinary people on social media. As a result, the 
common candidate, won the election defeating President Rajapaksa with a narrow 
margin. 
 
Living in a dystopia 
After seeing a video of the Sri Lankan police brutally beating up unarmed university 
students during a protest, one young person shared it on his Facebook page, with the
                                                
5 This was the main party of the ruling coalition and President Rajapaksa was the leader of this party. 
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caption 'hate this present fucking situation'6 (Annon 2014)7. He was fed up with the brutal 
treatment received by fellow citizens. Most importantly, he could not act against it in the 
real world because he would be subjected to the same brutal treatment. His expression 
about the ‘present’ situation he was living in was not only personal, but one representing 
the collective experience of many Sri Lankans during the period. In other words, it was 
an expression of living in a dystopia.  
As Fatima Vieira (2010) points out, Thomas More attributed both the meanings of 
‘non-place’ and ‘good place’ to his use of utopia. Here, the term describes an imaginary 
space, alternative to the harsh reality being witnessed. Following two World Wars the 
rise of fascist utopian thinking and especially the idea of a pure human race, the antithesis 
of utopia, namely 'dystopia' entered the popular discourse. Dystopia has been referred 
to as 'imaginary places that were worse than real places' (Vieira 2010:17). Expanding the 
popular understanding of the term, which focuses on imaginary places, some scholars 
argue the materiality of dystopia and maintain that it 'bears the aspect of lived experience' 
(Gordin, Tilley and Prakash 2010: 2). In other words, dystopia is mostly understood as a 
past-experience. The brutality of Nazi and Stalinist regimes have offered ample evidence 
of dystopian lived experience. Thus, although popular understanding of dystopia draws 
from the past, Annon’s expression in his Facebook post, articulates dystopia as a present 
experience, with an uncertain, although likely grim future. In other words, Annon is living 
in a dystopia. Below I describe how the dystopian present under the Rajapaksa regime 
generally revolved around two seemingly intractable problems: corruption and state 
violence. 
 
Corruption 
There was a strong public belief that the Rajapaksa regime was the most corrupt 
government in the history of post-colonial Sri Lanka. Their crimes, often given in granular 
detail, were circulated daily on Facebook. Such disseminations gave an air of helpless 
inevitability, and this was expressed in cynical posts also circulating in the Facebook 
community. During the election (or indeed one year prior), the government launched a 
massive election campaign under Rajapaksa's leadership, covering the country in blue8 
flags, posters and cut-outs of the president. But people understood well that politicians 
could not afford this kind of massive campaigning on their own. Pages, posts and 
comments, thus, surged reminding users of the corruption in the Rajapaksa regime. One 
                                                
6 The original quotations extracted from Facebook are indicated in mark and the rest are direct translations 
from Sinhala to English. 
7 The Facebook data I have used in this article is either posted on timelines with the 'public' option turned 
on where everyone can see the post; or comments to a public post; or to a post in a public group. In all 
cases, the identity of the author is visible to everyone.     
8 Blue is the official colour of SLFP. 
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such page was titled: 'Honourable President of Lamp Posts'9, basically making fun of the 
extensive use of public money on posters and cut-outs; but also suggesting he had 
become the president only for the lamp posts, and not the people of Sri Lanka. Also, there 
were many large cut-outs on high-tension pillars in the middle of paddy fields. This was 
mocked, in one instance, by a picture post which stated: 'now farmers don’t need 
strawmen…that’s because Mahinda [Rajapaksa] is in every high-tension pillar' 
(Noaddress 2014). Ruwan Bandara shared this with a caption: ‘the great king of cut out 
as the strawman in padifield [paddy field]!’ (Bandara 2014) – which reflected the 
common mentality towards these posters and cut-out campaigns.  
Another important factor about corruption was the abuse of public property in the 
election. For example, there was a video of a worker from the Road Development 
Authority of Sri Lanka, sticking posters of President Rajapaksa on walls. The video 
became viral on Facebook (Newsfirst.lk 2014a). Initially, it was broadcasted in a 
television news segment and then immediately posted on Facebook. What made this 
video viral on Facebook was the worker’s clear displeasure with what he was doing. 
Speaking directly to the camera he stated:10  ‘we are only working for our salary. We 
work on roads…there are thousands of posters left to stick. If someone can remove these 
[posters], it is a big help to me. When you give me money, I have to do whatever you 
say right? This is a huge pain […] If we say no we will lose our jobs and our salary’.  
The video went ‘viral’ because it had broad resonance in the populace. The act of 
sharing the video on personal timelines was a form of commiserating with the experience 
of the worker because they too had experienced it. Put differently, it seemed to 
encapsulate a common experience, thus requiring little or no additional comment. One 
user stated ‘when we say no, we lose the job and the salary’… shame on you [Rajapaksa], 
this is how you hang in walls and lamp posts in the whole Sri Lanka’ (Sachindra 2014). 
Another sighed ‘it is the poor who suffer from everything’ (Jayasooriya 2014). 
Sumithraarachchi, who was extremely frustrated about this injustice did not allow his 
lack of command of English to stop him from expressing his thoughts on this present: 
‘This is how they treat for the inacent pour [sic] people……. They dont [sic] want to du 
[sic] this job… but they have to……camand [sic] from Rajapaksa rajimi [sic]…this is [a] 
true storey [sic]..’ (Sumithraarachchi 2014). In contrast to these people, Faleel Marikkar 
who was a CEO of a hotel network and living in the United Kingdom, also shared the 
video stating ‘How people are forced to work for President!!!!’ (2014). The same 
expression with much more anger was illustrated in a post by a user named 
Keerthisinghe: ‘Fuck you Mahinda [Rajapaksa] why [are] you using this [these] poor 
people for your campaign by force?’ (2014). 
                                                
9 This page has been deleted by the admins. 
10 His face was blurred to conceal his identity. 
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The social background of these individuals provides an important picture of radical 
politics. These individuals cannot be understood from the concept of class in traditional 
Marxism because as it is clearly visible, they did not belong to a homogenous entity. For 
example, in traditional Marxism, certain classes have certain features which assign a 
place in the social hierarchy. Instead, this group of individuals came from different social 
strata. For instance, some spoke good English11 and some did not, some were rich and 
some were poor, some were educated and some were not. This heterogeneous 
complexity of individuals was a key feature of Facebook activism. However, what united 
them all was their common understanding of how hard their present was and their 
common goal of working together to change it and achieve a relatively good future. 
This video of the worker of the Road Development Authority reminded most people 
how miserable their lives were under the Rajapaksa regime. Gayanath Pradeep pointed 
out to everyone that regardless of whether you were pro- or anti-Rajapaksa, no one was 
safe under   his regime. He stated ‘today the majority of public and private sector workers 
as well as people who vehemently defend MaRa’s12 dictatorial system have to please 
MaRa to save their jobs’ (2014). This video reminded Jagath Koswatta that ‘we have to 
live in a country like this’ (2014). Young Nabeel Nawshad, clearly dissatisfied with being 
unable to do anything against this injustice, stated while sharing ‘Feeling guilty on the 
Present situation of our country Mr…Mahinda Rajapaksa’ (2014). He tagged President 
Rajapaksa’s official page to show his displeasure. Interestingly, he had used ‘Mr.’ to 
address the president the way he would address any ordinary person, thus challenging 
the president’s image of the great father (appachchi) or the great king (maha raja) In other 
words, he challenged the hegemony of Rajapaksa by considering President Rajapaksa 
not a special person, but another citizen of the country. Also, the fact that he used dots 
in between Mr. and Mahinda Rajapaksa, may be to indicate that there is a gap between 
the character of a mister and the corrupted character of the president 
 
Violence 
From the perspective of oppression, the Rajapaksa regime received enormous criticism 
for its abuse of power. Two incidents during the latter part of the election campaign 
captured the heart of the anti-Rajapaksa Facebook campaigns. One was the brutal police 
attack on protesting students of Higher National Diploma on Accountancy (HNDA). 
Police had been using extensive violence against protests perceived to threaten the 
government during the Rajapaksa period. The police brutally beat with batons both the 
male and female HDNA students fleeing from the scene. Since this happened two weeks 
                                                
11 English language determines one’s place in the social hierarchy in Sri Lanka. 
12MaRa is the shorter version of Mahinda Rajapaksa. People used this word to humiliate the president by 
not addressing him with his full name. Also, marain Sinhala refers to murdering. So by using it, people try 
to reflect the brutality of his rule as well. 
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prior to the election, it received massive attention from the Facebook community. The 
title of this video was ‘how thugs of Rajapaksa assault HNDA students brutally [.] Hey 
king you are definitely going to suffer for this’ (LankaFocusNews 2014). 
One young person described the violence people received from the police, when 
asking for their rights, with the following words: ‘When people ask for water they get 
beaten up, when farmers ask for reliefs they get beaten up, when students ask for 
education they get beaten up. What the hell is this?’ (Favaz 2014). Another youth was 
more concerned about his children’s future: ‘Pls [sic] take few secs [sic] to listen to 
this…This can be our children’s future one day’ (Jumly 2014). When Dhananjaya, 
another youth, saw the video when his (Facebook) friend shared it, he understood why 
these students got such a cruel beating: ‘These tears are worth a lot boys. You are 
poor…So suffer forever […] give the vote to the great king’ (2014). His statement ‘give 
the vote to the great king’ of course is reflective of his disillusionment in the political 
system. Jagath Samantha aptly sums up this general cynicism when he asks: ‘Ohhh… 
when can we smile in this country?’ (2014). 
Another incident that grabbed the attention of Facebook users during the election 
period was the physical attack on a group of artists and social activists named Aluth 
Parapura (New Generation). As they were performing to support the common candidate 
in a small town called Kumbukgete in Kurunegala district,  they were physically assaulted 
by a provincial councillor of the ruling party, along with a group of Rajapaksa supporters. 
As Aluth Parapura was mainly composed of young social media activists, they were able 
to generate massive support on Facebook against the attack. However, before this 
incident, veteran artist Jayathilaka Bandara, was subjected to two physical assaults by 
Rajapaksa’s henchmen in Eppawala and Hambanthota. The attack on Aluth Parapura 
was thus not uncommon for people who were campaigning against the president, but 
what was new was that Aluth Parapura managed to obtain massive support both in some 
traditional media outlets, and especially in social media. The video which showed the 
assault (Newsfirst.lk 2014b) received massive publicity especially on Facebook.  
Since this incident was extremely close to the date of the election, people were creating 
an ‘us vs them’ dichotomy and categorising and identifying others in relation to the 
violence in the now widely familiar video footage. The artists were beaten up by political 
‘thugs’, and were thus heralded as ‘true artists’; and artists that supported President 
Rajapaksa were labelled ‘buglers’ (Ranathunga 2014). Another quote stated that ‘animals 
of Blue Brigade attacked artists’ (Guruge 2014). Commenting on Guruge’s  post, a 
university lecturer, Daya Dissanayake, called these ‘thugs’ the ‘Blue Dogs’ Brigade’ 
(Dissanayake 2014).  
The characterisation of supporters of Rajapaksa as ‘animals’ is an interesting element 
in the anti-Rajapaksa discourse, and merits discussion. By ‘de-humanising’ Rajapaksa
2017   |   The South Asianist 5 (1): 366-390   |   pg. 375 
supporters, anti-Rajapaksa discourse defined anti-Rajapaksa supporters as ‘humans’. 
Here animals, and especially predators, symbolised the irrational, barbaric and 
aggressive behaviour of Rajapaksa supporters; while their ‘human’ opponents were 
rational, civilized and peaceful. This introduced a new layer of meaning to anti-
Rajapaksa discourse, which expressed a ‘reality’ in which animals had been ruling 
humans, and that this was unnatural. This discursive technique was also indicative of the 
extent of alienation felt by the large sectors of the public, and expressed in myriad, 
nuanced, and often not-so-nuanced ways online. Ashan Chaturanga summed up the 
whole situation in two words: ‘The reality’ (2014). 
The Rajapaksa regime sought to maintain their hold, and the hierarchical order of 
the society through violent means (Ranciere 1992). When students, whose role in the 
Rajapaksa hierarchy was to study, suddenly demanded solutions to their problems; or 
when artists, meant to lend support to the Rajapaksa regime, suddenly campaigned 
against injustice, they were swiftly, resolutely, and violently reminded of their place, and 
their role in the hierarchy. That Facebook provided a space where discontent could be 
expressed with ‘impunity’ was anathema. As illustrated in the following section, the 
dissatisfaction with the present now circulating widely online, readily accessible, and 
unregulated by the Rajapaksa regime, was soon masterfully employed by campaigners of 
the common candidate and civil leaders.  
 
The burning house 
The coherent picture of the dystopian present mainly represented two events. One was 
the song, ‘Aye aye noma iwasan’ (Don’t tolerate again), which was one of the official 
songs of the common candidate campaign. The other was the metaphor of ‘the burning 
house’ which was extracted from a poem of Bertolt Brecht and used during a television 
debate by a civil activist who campaigned for the common candidate. The ‘Aye aye noma 
iwasan’ song became extremely popular in Facebook as well as other media, because it 
masterfully captured the dissatisfaction of the anti-Rajapaksa discourse with the 
Rajapaksa present. It had a nice melody and the lyrics perfectly addressed the frustration 
ordinary people had. Also, the video of this song reminded of the dystopian reality. The 
translation of the song goes like this:  
 
We were told lies, 
And we fall for it every time. 
We are in a middle of a desert, going nowhere. 
Time passes but no pride. 
Dreams are crushed. 
We have been wrong. 
Toleration… 
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Don’t ever, don’t ever tolerate [this again]. 
Raise your heads who have courage. // 
 
Toleration has finished… 
Face shows frustration. 
Tiredness is in everyone’s face. 
When people who tolerate, suffer 
The whole world has gone forward. 
Don’t ever tolerate this again. 
Raise your heads who have hearts//  
(translation is mine) 
 
This song claims that, under this regime, people have no dignity, no happiness, but 
only helplessness, frustration and never ending tolerance to injustice. The reality they 
were facing was nameda desert, a place where no life is permitted. When people 
consider Sri Lanka, an island with beautiful rivers, waterfalls and vegetation, a desert, it 
reflects what has happened to their lives under this regime. These lyrics combined past, 
present and future and illustrated the Rajapaksa regime an ahistorical entity. In other 
words, under the Rajapaksa regime, time has become static. The past, the present and 
the future became one temporal context. For example, in the past, people were deceived 
by lies of a better future and what they experienced was misery. Therefore, the present 
remains hopeless. The misery was the same in the present as it was in the past. Nothing 
has changed. Also, the future would be the same as the past and the present because all 
the dreams have been crushed. As Marge Piercy points out, ‘[d]reams are the fire in us’ 
(in Sargent 1994: 2). Politically speaking, dreams will, either individually or collectively, 
envision a better future with regard to a bad present. In other words, ‘[i]f we are frustrated 
by something in our society, we dream of a society in which it is corrected’ (Sargent 
1994: 4). And even though our dreams are fulfilled, ‘[w]e still dream at least in part 
because, content, we are capable of recognizing that others are not and feel that others 
should also be fulfilled’ (Sargent 1994: 4). However, the song reminded people that they 
did not have dreams of a better future and as a result, they were stuck in this dystopian 
present. 
The videos of this song captured the meaning of this dystopia and forwarded a visual 
representation of that dystopia. There are two official versions of this video. One is a 
shorter version of the original song which is used as a television advertisement (Young 
Generation Sri Lanka 2014). The shorter video is a choreographed version. It 
reconstructed four main incidents that happened in the last decade. They were: the 
Rajapaksa supporters throwing stones at a peaceful protest of fishermen; the state 
violence on the protest in Rathupaswala which resulted in killing few innocent civilians, 
farmers protesting for a better price for their products and the constant brutal police 
attacks on university students. It resembled state brutality and oppression on non-violent
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protests of civilians. In the full version, the complete video is created through actual 
footages of government brutality available on YouTube (UPFA - A Brighter Future 2014a). 
In the beginning of the song, it stated that all the rights of these footages remained with 
the people who uploaded them to YouTube. In other words, the music video portrayed 
life under the Rajapaksa regime through the perspective of peoples’ experiences. Unlike 
in the shorter version, the longer version managed to cover most of the important 
incidents which reflected the brutality of the Rajapaksa regime including police brutality, 
protests of farmers and university lecturers and video clips of the families of forcefully 
disappeared people, deaths of unarmed protestors. 
These versions, mainly the longer one, have been circulated and recirculated on 
official Facebook pages of the common candidate, as well as, on personal accounts of 
Facebook users (UPFA - A Brighter Future 2014a, 2014b). One concurred with the 
recreation of the video by stating ‘True Stories’ (Vanarkadie 2014) and another, ‘REAL 
VEDIO [sic]’ (Kumarawardana 2014). Dikkumbura, a youth, who sympathized with the 
pain, experienced by the people in the video, stated while sharing it on his timeline, 
‘Sorry to say [sic] this is my country’ (Dikkumbura 2014).  
However, the most accurate metaphor to describe the dystopian nature of the 
Rajapaksa present was introduced by a prominent political activist and a civil leader, 
Gamini Viyangoda. In a television debate, he used the Sinhala translation of the poem, 
‘The Buddha’s Parable of the Burning House’, written by Bertolt Brecht, and this became 
viral in Facebook (We Are Ready 2014a). Since it was a story of Buddha, this reached a 
wide population in Sri Lanka. The poem began like this: 
 
Lately I saw a house. It was burning. The flames  
Licked at its roof. I went up close and observed 
That there were people still inside. I opened the door and called  
Out to them that the roof was ablaze, so exhorting them 
To leave at once. But those people  
Seemed in no hurry. One of them, 
When the heat was already scorching his eyebrows, 
Asked me what it was like outside, whether it wasn’t raining 
Whether the wind wasn’t blowing perhaps, Whether there was 
Another house for them, and more of this kind 
(Brecht 2011) 
 
Here Viyangoda compared the Rajapaksha regime to a burning house. There are 
people inside this burning house and they are almost about to burn, yet do nothing to 
survive. When Buddha opens the door and screams to them to come out, they stay 
emotionlessly and inquire about the positives and negatives of their alternatives. This 
showed how numb people had become under the Rajapaksa regime. They had no hope 
for a better future and were waiting to be burnt by the flames. As illustrated above, the 
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past, the present and the future had become a static entity where even a small change 
was impossible to imagine. Since the poem is written from Buddha’s point of view or, in 
other words, from a point of view of an outsider who sees the burning house and what is 
about to happen to the people inside, Viyangoda attempted to point out the way an 
outsider of the Rajapaksa discourse sees the reality of their present. Akila Rupasingha, a 
youth, explained his expression to this video while sharing it on his timeline which 
recollected the general attitude about this video: ‘Just WOW…The perfect explanation…’ 
(Rupasingha 2014). 
This is how the anti-Rajapaksa discourse understood and represented the experience 
of living under the Rajapaksa regime. It was living like senseless humans while everything 
around them was burning (or falling apart). And if they stayed doing nothing as they had 
been throughout the Rajapaksa regime, all of them would be destroyed. What can we do 
to escape from this burning house? 
 
The 'common candidate' campaign  
One could argue that there was a general atmosphere of resignation regarding the 
capacity for politics to be an agent of change. Even showing signs of discontent could 
trigger violent reprisal from Rajapaksa’s henchmen. Therefore, the general attitude 
regarding President Rajapaksa’s governance was that, corrupt and violent as he may be, 
there was no obvious or viable alternative. This sense of resignation rather assumed that 
the long tenure of President Rajapaksa’s regime was not only a given, but inevitable.  
However, this atmosphere of impotence shifted dramatically when Rajapaksa called 
the presidential election on January 8th 2015. When the presidential election was 
announced, the general secretary of SLFP, Maithripala Sirisena, along with a few key 
cabinet ministers, crossed over from the ruling alliance to the opposition, and the main 
opposition political parties named him the ‘common candidate’ of the opposition. Unlike 
other politicians in the ruling alliance, Sirisena had a low profile though he was the 
general secretary of SLFP. This was due in no large part to Rajapaksa’s domination of the 
political limelight. Sirisena also had a relatively clean record on corruption and misuse 
of state power. Therefore, in public life, Sirisena seemed to be a relatively good politician 
when compared to Rajapaksa.  
Social media users started to use ‘My3’ rather than ‘Maithri’ (Sirisena’s first name) to 
address the new candidate. An expression of endearment, it also indicated that this 
candidate was ‘closer’ to them than the president. The growing optimism in the possibility 
of defeating Rajapaksa was soon clearly visible online. However, Ruwan Nelu saw the 
danger of a complacent anti-Rajapaksa campaign due to the common candidate 
phenomena. Under the title, ‘this is a moment to stop telling love stories’, he stated:
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The opposition won the common candidate ‘game’. Some act as they have won the whole 
presidential election. To bring a person no one expected as the common candidate is a 
significant step. But this is not a duel as in the 18th century. Instead of two duelists, there are 
the spectators who have to vote to win or lose. Also, the people who win in a game are the 
players, not the spectators who watched it. In order to maintain fun [athal nokedimata] even 
after the party, there has to be a people’s action for people’s expectations in this fight (Nelu 
2014). 
 
He made an interesting observation about the voters, whom he described as 
spectators who watched politics from a distance rather than actors who critically and 
dynamically engaged in it. While sharing Nelu’s post on his timeline, Sameera 
Samarasinghe stated: ‘Actually this was the time for these people to be upgraded from 
followers to ‘citizens’’ (Samarasinghe 2014). Nelu and Samarasinghe both agreed that 
this was not the time for people to wait for others to fulfil their dream of a better future; 
instead they should act for themselves to achieve their own dreams. 
 
Was My3 the saviour? 
When Sirisena became the common candidate, people discussed on Facebook his 
credibility to represent people because he held a prominent place in the government, yet 
he did not take any substantive action against the wrongdoings of the regime. Many 
expressed how they felt about Sirisena on Facebook. Chameera Dedduwage, a well-
known figure on Facebook, described Sirisena, in one of his comments to his own post, 
as ‘a muddy pothole in the middle of a desert’. He further stated, ‘in this moment, he 
[Sirisena] is not the best solution…but the [only] alternative [we have] is him’ 
(Dedduwage 2014a). Nuwan Malaka put this idea bluntly: ‘I do not say that Maithripala 
Yapa Sirisena is a lotus of this political mire [or] the Bosath13 from [the heaven named] 
Tauthisa. It is a joke to find a virgin in the brothel called Sri Lankan politics’ (Malaka 
2014).  
Therefore, it was evident that people were not committing their efforts to replace 
Rajapaksa with Sirisena, but to have the policies that he agreed to implement. Dhanushka 
Premarathna commented to a post on a Facebook group which stated that Rajapaksa and 
Sirisena were the same: ‘my3 should be given power to achieve essential political reforms 
for the country. If he did not do them, he would fall into the bin of history. Even if he 
does not do these [policies], still that ideology would win because people gave him the 
power in order to do those things’ (Premarathna 2014). Commenting to the same post, 
Weeraparakrama Narendrasinghe described these essential reforms as a wish ‘to 
overthrow the bandit king, to abolish the executive system [and] establish independent 
commissions…’ (Narendrasinghe 2014).  
                                                
13 A person who will be Buddha in a future birth. 
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Kasun Pathirana, a young radical, articulated these ideas in an intellectual fashion in 
one of his Facebook posts. He pointed out that the cult of personalities had been a 
fundamental factor in Sri Lanka politics. Therefore, rather than following personalities, 
he stated ‘the common candidate is not an individual person but a series of political 
principles which originated after the common consent of antagonistic political parties, 
groups [and] organizations. As a result, [we] have to agree not on political characters but 
on principles’ (Pathirana 2014).  
Promoting political principles as described here clearly questions W. Lance Bennett’s 
claim that we live in ‘an era of personalized politics’ (2012: 20). He argues ‘individuals 
increasingly code their personal politics through personal lifestyle values’ (2012: 22). For 
example, questions like how environmental or worker friendly are my personal 
belongings such as vehicles and clothes, have dominated social media activism. 
However, in the Sri Lankan context, Facebook activism has gone beyond this 
personalized aspect of social media politics. They were demanding a good life against 
the dystopian present they were witnessing. 
Because of the uncertainty of how Sirisena would act after obtaining power, many 
Facebook activists did not bank their goals on him. The best way to understand the 
Sirisena phenomena is that people used Sirisena as a tool to escape from the Rajapaksa 
dystopia. Therefore, as Nirmal Dewasiri, a university lecturer and a prominent civil 
leader, once stated, defeating Rajapaksa and his regime was most important. If Sirisena 
had fulfilled at least some of his promises, then it would be a bonus14. Ravisha 
Thilakawardana, another prominent Facebook activist, posted a quotation on his timeline 
that was taken from the blog of Chinthana Dharmadasa and which aptly articulated the 
dynamism of the common candidate movement. 
 
This is why I like the common candidate movement. It is again a hope. It is an anonymous 
revolution. Who is the common candidate, will he win or will Mahinda be defeated are not 
most important. The most important thing is that there is at least a small number of people 
who can think, question and oppose. That change is enough for us to celebrate. 
(Thilakawardana 2014). 
 
Therefore, was Sirisena the saviour? The answer would be ‘wrong question’. People 
knew how corrupt Sri Lankan politics was from their own experiences. Therefore, unlike 
with previous elections, people were promoting principles. Since Facebook allowed a 
large number of people to express their opinions, promoting principles became 
immensely popular among the Facebook community. As a result, the common candidate 
movement did not revolve around individuals but around principles and Sirisena was 
considered as a tool to achieve these principles.
                                                
14 Through a personal correspondence with Nirmal Dewasiri. 
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Individual volunteerism 
As discussed above, people did not rally around Sirisena, instead they took the 
responsibility for overthrowing President Rajapaksa into their own hands. By forming 
loose collectives, individuals debated, discussed, shared information, as well as, their 
opinions and pressurized others, who were undecided for whom to vote to vote for 
Sirisena. This volunteer activism flourished on Facebook, and interestingly, it was highly 
independent from Sirisena’s official campaign. The dynamism of this activism surprised 
not only the organizers of Sirisena’s campaign but also the organizers of the Rajapaksa 
campaign. For example, one of the leading Rajapaksa campaigners who wanted to be 
anonymous, stated ‘[w]e could not even match the scale of social media campaigns of 
Maithree’ (Kalansooriya 2014). Also, Karu Paranawithana, now a deputy minister of the 
Sirisena government, stated during the election campaign, ‘[i]t [social media campaign] 
is entirely a social mobilization and we have nothing to do with these social media 
campaigners’ (Kalansooriya 2014).  
Clay Shirky (2011) points out two positive factors created by cyber space. One is that 
it has become a source of information. For example, videos and posts on current issues 
circulated and recirculated among Facebook users. As a result, television channels post 
more videos and posts on their official Facebook pages, to popularize their channels. 
Moreover, Facebook has become the quickest way to obtain news due to people’s 
activities such as posting and video uploading. The other factor is that Facebook allows 
people to express their thoughts. In other words, it has become a platform to discuss, 
debate and express ideas on different topics which have been suppressed on mainstream 
media. Between 2010 and 2015, there was no space in Sri Lankan mainstream media for 
peoples’ grievances. For example, In Freedom House (2014) rankings Sri Lanka has been 
categorized as ‘Not Free’ under freedom of the press category for the year 2013. 
Therefore, during the electoral campaign (and even before that), people used this space 
to show their displeasure by either commenting or sharing humorous posts. So, Facebook 
became an excellent mechanism for connecting public grievances in Sri Lanka. 
It is important to keep in mind that there is no one particular moment for the 
beginning of Facebook activism against Rajapaksa. Some had started this mission way 
before Sirisena’s crossover, and some joined the Facebook campaigns later. Also, this 
Facebook activism happened in different spaces and in different forms and sometimes 
independently of one another. This gave the whole gamut of social media activism an 
anarchistic tone, with no identifiable centre directing activities.   
On Facebook, censored subjects such as the Rajapaksa family and the Rajapaksa 
administration had been heavily criticised. In the mainstream media, there was some 
news on the Rajapaksa family’s questionable behaviour. However, the media was silent 
on Gotabaya Rajapaksa, the youngest brother of the president. It was widely believed 
that Gotabaya indeed had great influence in state repression. Conversely, Facebook 
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seemed to evade their control, as a number of incidents specifically regarding Gotabaya 
Rajapaksa circulated widely, and were openly discussed and debated. For example, the 
mainstream media largely stayed away from the District Court of Mount Lavinia in 
Colombo, in which Gotabaya testified. One reporter that braved the event was barred by 
police from entering to video the proceedings. He did, however, manage to record all 
the police interventions, and this footage was posted on Facebook (Alokaya 2014). 
Facebook users added captions when sharing the video footage, openly showing disdain 
for the police behaviour. Captions, for instance, read: ‘is Gota the almighty god?’15; ‘Don’t 
get into trouble later after recording Gota’; and ‘They say people who have brains don’t 
record Gota’. It is also important to note the police incident was not mentioned by any 
media channels. Another popular video featured Gotabaya threatening via mobile phone 
a senior police officer, warning him to withdraw all the police from protecting the UN 
head office from a pro government rally (UPFA-A Brighter Future 2014c). This video 
showed to the extent the police had been politicised. The video was immensely popular 
on Facebook and received approximately 270,000 views, 2500 likes and 18,000 shares. 
Also, there were another 150 comments, most of them showing their discontent with the 
incident. Social media users openly criticised Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s place in the 
Rajapaksa hierarchy – a position that had been beyond reach for ordinary people. 
Apart from being a platform to voice individual opinions, Facebook, as discussed 
above, became a space to share and receive the latest political news which had been 
censored in the mainstream media. Mostly, such stories circulated on Facebook as chatter 
as, due to strong censorship, it was extremely difficult to verify their authenticity. 
However, the informal sharing of anecdotes and comments was seen as more reliable 
than news received from mainstream media. For example, a parliamentarian of the ruling 
party who was close to the Rajapaksa family, physically assaulted the Sri Lankan high 
commissioner in the United Kingdom in 2014. The parliamentarian was well known for 
his involvement in corruption, while the high commissioner was largely respected. The 
incident first appeared on Facebook as gossip. However, later, it was verified and was 
even debated in parliament (Ape Media Social Media 2014).  
Facebook activism introduced a new type of collectivism to Sri Lankan politics. As 
Wellman (2001) points out, ‘place’ had become an insignificant factor due to the 
emergence of Facebook. This can be termed as ‘networked individualism’, a new type of 
a collectivism which has emerged due to social media politics. As Wellman describes, 
networked individualism is the transformation of communication from ‘place to place’ to 
‘person to person’. This means that previously ‘place’ (as a spatial context) was a major 
element in collective action. But with the rise of social media, the importance of ‘place’ 
has been transformed to the person. In other words, ‘place’ is no longer a factor for 
activism because through social media, individuals can be a part of a collective action
                                                
15Gota is the nick name for Gotabaya Rajapaksha. 
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without physically being in the place. In this new collectivism, the importance of being 
in a place where the real action was happening decreased dramatically. For example, 
‘[s]everal individuals in Europe had volunteered to keep the page [that is ‘Rajapaksa, We 
are Ready’ one of the most influential political pages during the election] alive when the 
Sri Lankan team goes to sleep’ (Kalansooriya 2014). In other words, people who were 
keen to defeat the Rajapaksa regime did not have to be in Sri Lanka to support the 
struggle.  
The origin of ‘Rajapaksa, We are Ready’ Facebook page, was a spontaneous decision 
among a few Facebook activists. Ravisha Thilakawardana, one of the founders of this 
page, described it in the following words: ‘We were a group of unknown individuals who 
used to chat on socio-political issues on Facebook. But a few of us gathered at a bar on 
the night of Maithri’s cross over and thought we should do something. When we finished 
a couple of beer bottles, the Facebook page was already up and running’ (Kalansooriya 
2014). When ‘Rajapaksa, We are Ready’ page became popular in a short time, Sirisena 
campaigners requested this group to join the official Facebook page of Sirisena, ‘UPFA-
A Brighter Future’ and, due to this, this page became one of the most influential pages 
during the election period. In a post roughly one year after the calling of the presidential 
election, UPFA-A Brighter Future page stated that it received only 40000 likes during the 
period from 2010 to 21st November 2014. The number of likes had increased up to 
357,000 during one year; and only in the night of January 8th 2015, the page received 
18,000 likes. In some weeks during the election, the number of total post reach16 went 
as high as 15 million17 (UPFA-A Brighter Future 2015). 
Since there were no reliable election polls to predict the election result, Chameera 
Dedduwage took this matter in his own hands. On 12th December, 2014, while travelling 
from Bemmulla to Pettah by train, roughly a 30km distance, he listened to the political 
discussions among the passengers taking place on that journey and categorized for whom 
these passengers might vote. He assumed 4 passengers would vote for the president and 
more than 11 passengers for the common candidate. Another 4 passengers did not want 
to vote for anyone or rejected these two candidates. Interestingly, 16 passengers did not 
participate in these discussions (Dedduwage 2014b). Commenting to this post, Nihal 
Priyashantha described the political composition of 50 people of his workplace as 62% 
for the common candidate, 29% for the president and another 9%. (Priyashantha 2014). 
On 21st December, 2014 between approximately 2 p.m. and 3 p.m., Dedduwage did 50 
informal face-to-face interviews between Maharagama and Dehiwala, an area which is 
traditionally understood as pro-Rajapaksa. The results were the following: 
  
                                                
16 In Facebook terms, post reach indicates the number of views to all the posts of a particular Facebook 
page. 
17 This post does not explicitly state that this amount of post reach occurred during the presidential election.  
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Vote for Mahinda – 14 (reasons are below) 
- No Chandrika [Kumaratunga]/Ranil [Wickramasinghe]18 (5)  
- Construction of roads and parks (5) 
- Won the war/saved the country (3) 
- No reason (1) 
 Vote for Maithri – 21 (reasons are below) 
- No law in the country (6) 
- The weight of loans is high/sold the country to China (6) 
- Waste, corruption, fraud, nepotism (3) 
- Buddhists were discriminated (3) 
- Hard to live (1) 
- The country is going in the wrong direction (1) 
- Have to show gratitude19 (1) 
 People who refused to give their opinion – (15)  
 Important- [Rajapaksa will win by] tricks/ fraud/ violence [-] (10) (Dedduwage 
2014c). 
 
 Certainly the reliability of these surveys and polls is arguable. However, one cannot 
ignore the commitment of individual users to search the broader online community they 
are engaged with for consensus on topics that to them are of critical importance. As 
described above, the mainstream media had lost their capacity to critique President 
Rajapaksa. Therefore, even though one sensed through one’s daily interactions and 
observations that the momentum of the election was with Sirisena, one did not see that 
momentum reflected in the mainstream media. Therefore, people were sharing their 
individual observations and perceptions on the political condition at the grassroots level 
by posting these informal surveys and interviews on Facebook. 
 
Conclusion 
How did butterflies take down giants? Or in more academic terms, how did people with 
little power effectively unseat one of the most oppressive regimes post-colonial Sri Lanka 
had ever witnessed? In this context, the article is organized in order to understand how 
people used social media as a platform to discuss, debate and express their opinions 
about the present they were living. Through these discussions, debates and expressions, 
on social media the Rajapaksa regime was commonly understood as dystopic. As I 
argued, people used the realisation of their living in a dystopia to escape from that present 
by transforming the Facebook platform from a private space initially used to connect
                                                
18Chandrika Kumaratunga was the president before Mahinda Rajapaksa. Though they belong to the same 
political party, they had an intense political relationship due to their social status. Ranil Wickramasinghe 
had been the opposition leader as well as the leader of the main opposition party for nearly two decades.  
19 This was politically a sarcastic reason. Vote for Rajapaksa ‘to show your gratitude’ was a popular slogan 
in Rajapaksa campaign. In this regard, this person was going to show ‘his gratitude’ to Rajapaksa by voting 
for Sirisena. 
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with friends, into a political space. Using it as such, they discussed, debated and 
expressed their opinions in an effort to change the Rajapaksa regime, the main cause for 
their dystopian present. On the other hand, when the president called the election, 
Facebook became a place to convince people to vote for the common candidate. During 
this whole period, the anti-Rajapaksa discourse used dystopia as a concept to encourage 
people to overcome their oppressive present. Finally, in the morning of 9th January, 2015, 
people realised their efforts had not been wasted after seeing a Facebook video of 
Rajapaksa fleeing from the presidential residence back to his home town. 
Since the general opinion across the political spectrum is of that regime 
transformation is necessarily a change in elites, this research describes how people who 
were less concerned about the political elites, acted together with other Facebook users, 
regardless of social status, to effectively change their present. For instance, anti-Rajapaksa 
discourse was strengthened by people from all walks of life. Since Facebook is accessible 
and used by the public, users, regardless of their social status, engaged in lively debates 
and discussions, thus becoming a platform to share information of the Rajapaksa regime 
and discuss various political topics. Most importantly, these Facebook activities occurred 
without the interference of the regime, and were not controlled by any type of 
governmental or private group. Therefore, in general, the individuality (of different 
opinions) had become important on Facebook. These factors had led to the emergence 
of a large group of individuals independent from the influence of mainstream politics. As 
I have illustrated, in this regime transformation, the influence of this group was 
significant. Even the officials of the Rajapaksa campaign as well as the Sirisena campaign 
concurred this factor. 
As analysed in the research, people were not necessarily Sirisena followers. They 
were conscious of the untrustworthy nature of Sri Lankan politics. Therefore, rather than 
following an individual, they supported a set of ideals such as good governance, 
democracy and the rule of law. Hence, unlike previous ones, this presidential election 
was not understood as a struggle between two candidates, but rather as a struggle 
between a dystopian present (represented by the Rajapaksa regime) and political 
principles (represented by the common candidate).  
All these factors contradict the understanding of regime transformation as reshuffling 
among elites. As pointed out, politics on Facebook, which was unregulated, and thus 
independent from the kind of influence the elites had over traditional media outlets, 
played a key role in this regime change. Thus, this is a story of ‘butterflies who took down 
giants’. On January 11th, 2015, three days after the election, after overcoming the initial 
shock of defeating the mighty Rajapaksa regime, one ‘butterfly’, under the title ‘it 
happened’, shared a picture of a quotation which is believed to be from Mao Zedong: ’A 
dictator can implement laws to crush all the roses. But [he] cannot keep the spring from 
coming’ (Dilanka 2015).  
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Appendices 
 
President Rajapaksa meeting his supporters during a tour in Italy.  
 
(Source: http://www.gossip-lanka.com/2012/10/president-mahinda-rajapaksa-tattoo_23.html. 
Reproduced with permission)
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